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MILWAUKEE SPRING DIVISION OF ILLINOIS
COIL SPRING COMPANY: WORK
RELOCATION AS A MEANS TO
OBTAIN MIDTERM
CONTRACT CONCESSIONS
The economic climate of the late 1970's and early 1980's has had, and
likely will continue to have, a significant effect on American labor relations.' Employers, faced with an adverse economic outlook and high labor
costs, are seeking wage and benefit concessions from unions to ameliorate
their financial troubles.2 Normally, concession bargaining occurs during
the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA). 3 Recently, however, employers seeking contract concessions have begun to approach the unions in midterm of the CBAs.4 In response to union refusals
to make concessions, some employers have attempted to evade their contractual obligations by transferring work to geographic areas having lower
labor costs.'
1. See BNA SPECIAL REPORT, LABOR RELATIONS IN AN ECONOMIC RECESSION: JOB
LOSSES AND CONCESSION BARGAINING (July 29, 1982). In 1982 the economy suffered the
worst layoff and unemployment figures since the Great Depression. Id at 23.
2. Id. at 23-54. See GM Seen Offering UAWa Contract Today Asking GreaterConcessions than Before, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1982, at 2, col. 1; FordAsks Concessions,N.Y. Times,
Nov. 19, 1981, at 36, col. 5.
3. A collective bargaining agreement is a contract or a mutual understanding between
a union and an employer. Generally, the agreement sets forth the terms and conditions of
employment including wages, hours, seniority, vacation pay, bargaining unit, grievance procedures, and other working conditions. See H. ROBERTS, ROBERTS' DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 15 (2d ed. 1971).
4. On some occasions, unions have agreed to accept modified contract terms. See
Henley, Reverse Collective Bargaining? A Look at Some Union Concession Situations, 26
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 956 (1973); S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIEBERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 846-51 (1960); Pan Am Union Grants
Concessions; Traffic Declined in November, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1982, at 24, col. I; World
Airways Wins Concessions by Union, L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1982, § IV, at 2, col. 1; Ford
Workers Accept Concessionsin New Contract by Wide Margin, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1982, at
1, col. 1; New Pact Reached by Fordand Union; Concessions Made, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,
1982, at 1, col.6; Teamsters Agree to Tentative Pact with Concessions, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16,
1982, at Al, col. 4; Now, It's Pay Cuts Insteadof Raises, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb.
9, 1981, at 74; see also First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-82 n.19
(1981) ("unions have aided employers in saving failing businesses by lending technical
assistance, reducing wages and benefits or increasing production, and even loaning part of
earned wages to forestall closures").
5. In a series of decisions, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) held
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The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), in Los Angeles
Marine HardwareCo., a Division of Mission Marine Associates, Inc.,6 held
that a relocation of work out of the bargaining unit7 during the pendency
of the CBA and without the union's consent violates section 8(d)' of the
that the transfer of work out of the bargaining unit during the life of the CBA, if motivated
by an employer's desire to evade the contract's labor costs, constituted an unlawful midterm
modification of the CBA under § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act).
See Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982); Brown Co., 243
N.L.R.B. 769 (1979), remanded without opinion, 663 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1981); Los Angeles
Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979);
Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977), enforcement denied, 581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1978); University of Chicago, 210 N.L.R.B. 190 (1974), enforcement denied, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.
1975). See infra notes 46-106 and accompanying text; see also Quarterly Report of NLRB
General Counsel William A. Lubbers, DAILY LAB. REP. No. 3 (BNA), Jan. 5, 1983, at D-1.
6. 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979). See infra notes 6882 and accompanying text.
7. A bargaining unit is a group of employees found by a Labor Board to constitute a
unit appropriate for bargaining purposes. The standards commonly used by the Boards
include: 1)the desire of the employees; 2) functional coherence; 3) mutuality of interest
based on occupation or skill; and 4) the history of collective bargaining. Where no official
designation is made, it is the unit accepted by the employer for bargaining purposes. H.
ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 46-47.
8. The Board specifically found that the employer had violated §§ 8(d) and 8(a)(1), (3)
and (5) of the Act. Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. at 737. Section 8(d)
provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively
shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification. . .(4) continues
in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and
conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is
given or until the expiration of such contract, whichever occurs later.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
Section 8(a)(l) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
Section 7 provides that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
Section 8(a)(3) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
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National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act).9 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's Order, 0 despite evidence that the employer's decision to relocate was economically motivated
and was not the result of antiunion animus." Further evidence existed
that the employer had attempted to bargain with the union regarding relocation and its effect on unit employees. 12
Until very recently, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Los Angeles Marine
had been largely ignored. There has, however, been a surge of work relocation cases premised upon Los Angeles Marine3 in which the Board has
sought to enjoin relocation of bargaining unit work by employers during
the pendency of a CBA. 4 The most recent development in this area of the
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1982).
Section 8(a)(5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
9. The National Labor Relations Act is comprised of the National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-167
(1982)); the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101,
61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-187 (1982)); and the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
tit. VII, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-160, 164, 186-187 (1982)).
10. Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979).
11. Id at 1306. Conduct motivated by antiunion animus and having the foreseeable
effect of either encouraging or discouraging union membership violates § 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA. See supra note 8. Where an employer's conduct has only a "comparatively slight"
adverse effect on employee § 7 rights, and the employer has come forward with evidence of a
legitimate and substantial business justification, antiunion motivation must be proved to
sustain a § 8(a)(3) violation. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967)
(quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 289 (1965)). On the other hand, where the conduct
is "inherently destructive" of employee rights, no affirmative showing of the employer's unlawful motivation is necessary to establish a § 8(a)(3) violation. See NLRB v. Brown, 380
U.S. at 287; see also infra note 79.
12. Los Angeles Marine, 602 F.2d at 1306.
13. This proliferation of relocation cases prompted one management labor lawyer to
remark: "[W]e had all best read rather carefully the Board and the court decision in Los
Angeles Marine Hardware Co.. . . I think many of us had been ignoring that case, thinking
it was a sport, but we cannot do so any longer." See E. Miller, Remarks at the South Western Legal Foundation, 29th Annual Institute (Oct. 21, 1982). See also infranotes 83-106 and
accompanying text.
14. See Quarterly Report of NLRB General Counsel William A. Lubbers, DAILY LAB.
REP. No. 3 (BNA), Jan. 5, 1983, at D-1. The NLRB's General Counsel devoted his entire
1983 first quarter report to cases involving unlawful relocation of bargaining-unit work. The
report included cases decided by the NLRB Division of Advice upon a request for advice or
on appeal from a regional director's dismissal of unfair labor practice charges. It also contained relocation cases in which the Board authorized § 10(j) proceedings as well as a listing
of every § 10(j) case authorized by the Board for the first six months of calendar year 1982.
Id
Section 10(j) of the Act empowers the Board, "upon issuance of a complaint. . . charging
that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any
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law has been the Board's decision in Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois
5
Coil Spring Co.'
In its initial Milwaukee Spring decision (Milwaukee Spring 1),16 the
Board extensively discussed and unequivocally reaffirmed Los Angeles
Marine.'7 The Board found that the employer's decision to transfer the
assembly operation without the union's consent, and consequently, to furlough unit employees during the term of the CBA, constituted a midterm
modification within the meaning of section 8(d) of the Act. 18 The employer filed a petition for review of the Board's Decision and Order with
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the Board
filed a cross-application for enforcement of its Order.' 9 Prior to review,

United States district court ... for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order." 29
U.S.C. § 1600) (1982). A district court will not grant temporary injunctive relief under
§ 10(j), however, without a showing of "probable cause" that an unfair labor practice has
occurred and a conclusion that an injunction would be "just and proper" under the circumstances of the case. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 180-81 (1977).
Relying on the LosAngeles Marine theory that relocation of bargaining-unit work during
the term of an existing CBA constitutes an unfair labor practice, the Board successfully has
invoked § 10(j) to prevent three other plants from relocating under similar circumstances.
See Gottfried v. Echlin Inc., 113 L.R.R.M. 2349 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Kobell v. Thorson Tool
Co., 112 L.R.R.M. 2397 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Zipp v. Bohn Heat Transfer Group, 110 L.R.R.M.
3013 (C.D. 111.1982).
15. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Milwaukee
Spring 1].
Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982) [hereinafter
16. Milwaukee Spring Div. of I11.
cited as Milwaukee Spring 1].
17. Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d
1302 (9th Cir. 1979). See infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
18. Milwaukee Spring , 265 N.L.R.B. at 208. See supra note 8. Pursuant to § 10(b) of
the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982), an unfair labor practice case is initiated when a private
party files a charge with the appropriate regional Board office that an unfair labor practice
has been committed. 29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (1983). The regional office investigates the charge,
and its director must decide whether to issue a complaint. Id.§ 102.15. If a complaint is
issued, a Board attorney from the regional office will prosecute the case which is tried in a
formal hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Id.§ 102.35. The ALJ makes
findings of fact and then issues a recommended decision and order either indicating the
appropriate remedy or suggesting that the complaint be dismissed. Id § 102.45. The charging party, respondent, or General Counsel of the NLRB may file exceptions to this recommended order. Id § 102.46. If no exceptions are filed, the order automatically becomes
final as an order issued by the Board. Id.§ 102.48. If timely exceptions are filed, the case is
transferred to the Board, which then issues its own final decision and order. Id. A party
aggrieved by a final order of the Board may petition a federal court of appeals for review of
the order. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982). A Board decision or order is not self-executing.
Hence, the Board must petition for judicial enforcement against a recalcitrant party. 29
U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982). See also T. KAMMHOLZ & S. TRAuss, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 93-95 (1980).
19. Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1065. See supra note
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the court granted the Board's motion to remand Milwaukee Spring I for
additional consideration. 2 °
On remand (Milwaukee Spring II), the Board reversed Milwaukee
Spring I, and dismissed the complaint against the employer. 2' It held that,
in the absence of a specific work-preservation clause, an employer is free to
transfer work out of the bargaining unit during the term of the CBA if the
employer first satisfies any contractual obligations to bargain about the relocation decision.2 2 In dissent, Member Zimmerman argued that section
8(d) prohibits an employer from relocating bargaining-unit work in order
to evade the contract's wage rate during the life of the agreement unless
the employer first obtains the union's consent.23
This Note will examine the evolution of the law as applied to work relocations to obtain concessions during the term of an existing CBA. It will
focus on the two most significant and recent Board decisions, Los Angeles
Marine and Milwaukee Spring , and will demonstrate that these decisions
are consonant with the underlying policies and philosophy of the National
Labor Relations Act. Finally, this Note will conclude that Milwaukee
Spring II is inconsistent with the congressional policy of encouraging the
labor stability that results from the negotiation of CBAs of fixed duration.
I.

NLRA:

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS A "SHARED PROCESS"

The general purpose of the NLRA is to promote peaceful resolution of
industrial disputes by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining.2 4 Through the NLRA, Congress sought to reduce the economic inequality between labor and management by increasing the bargaining power of employees.2 5 Congress recognized that refusals by
20. The Seventh Circuit remanded Milwaukee Spring I on August 4, 1983, in accordance with the Board's motion. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
21. Milwaukee Spring11, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1066.
22. Id.
23. Id.at 1069.
24. See S. REP. No. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1935 ACT]; see also First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981) (purpose of NLRA "is the promotion of collective bargaining as a method of defusing. . . conflict between labor and management"); American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316-17 (1965) (purpose of NLRA "was to reduce the
perceived imbalance of economic power between labor and management"); Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964) (purpose of NLRA "is to promote the
peaceful settlement of industrial disputes . . . within the framework [of collective bargaining] established by Congress as most conducive to industrial peace").
25. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I, 42-43 (1937); see also S.
REP. No. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), reprinted in I NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
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In 1935, Congress imposed a duty upon employers to bargain in good
faith with employee representatives.2 7 Section 8(d) of the Act defines this
duty, which includes the mutual obligation of the employer and the union
to meet at reasonable times and to Confer in good faith.2 8 Hence, collective bargaining is a "shared process" in which each party has the right to
participate actively. 2 9 The parties, moreover, are required to bargain collectively over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."3 Either party is obligated, upon request of the other party, to
1935 ACT, supra note 24, at 1 (the purpose of NLRA is to "equalize the bargaining power of

employers and employees").
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) ("The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest.. ").
27. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982) (originally enacted as National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 8(5), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935)).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (added by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)). See Hartley, The Framework of Democracy in Union Government, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 13 (1982). Hartley noted that the enactment
of Taft-Hartley in 1947 was "a reaffirmation of the national commitment to the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining." Id at 46-47.
29. General Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 194 (1964).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). See supra note 8. The Supreme Court noted in First
Nat'l Maintenance Corp. that "Congress has limited the mandate or duty to bargain to matters of 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment'

. . .

. [B]oth an em-

ployer and union may bargain to impasse over these matters and use the economic weapons
at their disposal to attempt to secure their respective aims." 452 U.S. 666, 674-75 (1981)
(citing American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952)). The original House bill, proposed
during the formulation of § 8(d), contained a specific list of mandatory subjects of bargaining. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 166-67 (1948) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947 ACT]; see H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
22-23 (1947), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947 ACT, supra,at 313-14. The minor-

ity House bill urged rejection of the original bill, arguing that a specific list of mandatory
subjects would effectively exclude numerous topics which had traditionally fallen within the
scope of collective bargaining. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947) (minority
report), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947 ACT, supra, at 362. The minority report

further contended:
The appropriate scope of collective bargaining cannot be determined by a formula;
it will inevitably depend upon the traditions of an industry, the social and political
climate at any given time, the needs of employers and employees, and many related factors. What are proper subject matters for collective bargaining should be
left in the first instance to employers and trade-unions, and in the second place, to
any administrative agency skilled in the field and competent to devote the necessary time to a study of industrial practices and traditions in each industry or area of
the country, subject to review by the courts. It cannot and should not be straitjacketed by legislative enactment.
Id. The narrow language of the original House bill was supplanted in conference by the
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bargain in good faith over these mandatory subjects. 3 1 This statutory duty
to bargain in good faith, however, does not include a duty to agree on any
of the subjects bargained over. 32 Once the parties have reached an impasse33 over a mandatory subject, the parties may act unilaterally.34
broad language adopted by the Senate. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1947), reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947 ACT, supra,at 114-15.
31. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). Mandatory bargaining has been required over a variety of subjects. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441
U.S. 488, 494-95 (1979) (price of food in company cafeterias); NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963) (establishment of agency shop); Awrey Bakeries, Inc. v. NLRB,
548 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1976) (layoffs and recalls); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. NLRB,
406 F.2d 552, 554-55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,395 U.S. 935 (1969) (company housing); Kroger
Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,395 U.S. 904 (1969) (profit-sharing
plans); NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am., 349 F.2d 449, 451 (5th
Cir. 1965) (hiring practices); Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbldg. Workers v. NLRB, 320
F.2d 615, 620 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,375 U.S. 984 (1964) (seniority and grievance procedures); Richfield Oil Co. v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 717, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (stock purchase
plans); W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949) (insurance plans);
Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960
(1949) (pensions); NLRB v. J.H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766, 768-69 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 814 (1948) (merit wage increases); Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131 , 136-37
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941) (bonuses); Oughton v. NLRB 118 F.2d 486, 498
(3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied,315 U.S. 797 (1942) (compensation); Dolly Madison Indus. Inc.,
182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970) ("most favored nation" clauses); Miller Brewing Co., 166
N.L.R.B. 831 (1967) (plant work rules).
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), supra note 8. While the Board cannot compel the
parties to demonstrate good faith by incorporating any specific contract provisions, see H.K.
Porter, Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), it can evaluate the negotiations between the parties
to determine the reasonableness of any position taken and require evidence that the parties
are making an effort to reach a common ground. See Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131,
134-35 (1st Cir. 1953); see also NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 486
(1980) ("Obviously there is tension between the principle that the parties need not contract
on any specific terms and a partial enforcement of the principle that they are bound to deal
with each other in a serious attempt to resolve differences and reach a common ground.").
33. An impasse is reached when there is a clear deadlock and further negotiations
would be fruitless. Relevant factors to be considered in deciding whether an impasse in
bargaining exists include bargaining history, the good faith of the parties, the length of negotiations, the importance of the remaining issues under discussion, and the understanding of
the parties as to the state of negotiations. See Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478
(1967), enforced sub nom. AFTRA v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). Once the employer and union
have bargained to a good faith impasse, an employer is free to unilaterally implement its
original decision. 1d If a subject is permissive rather than mandatory, however, the employer may lawfully refuse to bargain and may act unilaterally to implement its decisions.
See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342, 349. There are no affirmative obligations on the part of
either party concerning bargaining over permissive subjects. "[Elach party is free to bargain
or not to bargain, and to agree or not agree." Id at 349. The Board has deemed certain
subjects permissive rather than mandatory. See e.g., Kit Mfg. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 662 (1964),
enforced, 365 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1966) (union label); Detroit Resilient Floor Decorators Local 2265, 136 N.L.R.B. 769 (1962), enforced, 317 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1963) (industrial promotion funds); Scripto Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 411 (1941) (performance bonds).

1008

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 33:1001

In addition to defining the duty to bargain, section 8(d) of the Act imposes a duty upon each party to a CBA to refrain from modifying the CBA
without complying with notice and waiting period requirements. 35 Section
8(d) further provides that neither party to a CBA may be compelled to
discuss or to agree to a midterm modification of a term contained in the
CBA.3 6 The mandates of section 8(d) apply, however, only to those particular contract terms that are deemed to be mandatory subjects of bargaining.37 When an employer unilaterally modifies the terms or conditions of
employment during the effective period of a contract without the consent
of the union, the employer acts in derogation of his duty to bargain under
section 8(d), 38 thereby violating section 8(a)(5) of the Act.39 This violation
occurs even if the union has refused to discuss the changes proposed by the
35. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), supra note 8. Section 8(d)(4) states that it will be a violation of the duty to bargain unless a party seeking to terminate or modify the contract "continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and
conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until
the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (1982).
36. Section 8(d) expressly provides:
the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or
agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a
fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
37. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. I v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 183-88 (1971). "Accordingly, just as section 8(d) defines the obligation to bargain with respect to mandatory terms alone, so it prescribes the
duty to maintain only mandatory terms without unilateral modification for the duration of
the collective-bargaining agreement." Id at 185-86. Hence, a unilateral modification of a
permissive bargaining subject contained in a contract is not an unfair labor practice. Id.
See supra note 34. The remedy available for an injured party in such a case is to institute a
breach of contract action under § 301 the Act.
Section 301 provides in pertinent part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this act, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), supra note 8. Neither good faith nor economic exigencies
permit an employer to make unilateral modifications of contractual terms or conditions of
employment during the effective period of the contract. See Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co.,
207 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1973), enforced,505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974) (employer who reduced
wages to meet economic crisis unilaterally modified the CBA within the meaning of § 8(d) of
the Act).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982), supranote 8. A § 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain will always
be accompanied by a violation of § 8(a)(l). Section 8(a)(1) prohibits certain employer actions that "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Because a violation of § 8(a)(5) interferes with
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employer.4' Moreover, bargaining to impasse concerning proposed contract changes does not excuse a unilateral modification of a mandatory
term contained in the CBA.41
Through enactment of section 8(d) of the Act in 1947, Congress rejected
the then prevailing union philosophy that an employer was obligated,
upon the request of the union, to renegotiate terms contained in the existing CBA. 42 It was the clear intent of Congress in 1947 to reject this
system of continuous bargaining in favor of a model compelling each party
to be bound by the contract for its term absent consent by the other party
to voluntarily renegotiate.4 3
one of the employee's § 7 rights-the right to bargain collectively-a violation of § 8(a)(1)
occurs. See supra note 8 for a delineation of an employee's rights under § 7 of the Act.
Some employer actions that violate § 8(a)(5) so fundamentally undermine employee § 7
rights that they are "inherently destructive" of these rights, and thus constitute in addition to
a § 8(a)(l) violation, a separate § 8(a)(3) violation as well. Section 8(a)(3) prohibits employers from engaging in "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). See infra note 79.
40. See Nassau County Health Care Facilities Ass'n, 227 N.L.R.B. 1680, 1683 (1977);
C & S Indus. Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454, 457 (1966). Parties to an existing CBA are under no
duty to discuss changes to the terms of the contract proposed by the other party. See Jacobs
Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951); Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
41. See NLRB v. Scan Instrument Corp., 394 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1968) (terms contained in a CBA are "frozen as ... term[s] or conditions[s] of employment for the contract
period involved absent mutual consent of the contracting parties to this alteration or
qualification").
42. See NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 342 (1938).
43. See supra notes 24-41 and accompanying text. The legislative history of § 8(d) is
replete with references to the rights of the parties to refuse to bargain over terms contained
in the CBA. The House Report explained that § 8(d) "does not require bargaining on any
matter during the term of the collective bargaining agreement, except as the express terms of
the agreement permit." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947 ACT, supra note 30, at 361; H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 35 (1947), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947 ACT, supranote 30, at 539. The
parties, however, are free to discuss changed circumstances. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 7002
(1947), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1947 ACT, supranote 30, at 1624 (statement of
Sen. Taft) ("Parties may meet and discuss the meaning of the terms of their contract and
may agree to modifications or change of circumstances, but it is not mandatory that they do
so.").
Congress' primary concern in enacting § 8(d) was to prohibit the parties from resorting to
the use of economic weapons. See 93 CONG. REC. 6611 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF 1947 ACT, supra note 30, at 1557 (statement of Sen. Morse) ("[Tihe union, once
it signs a contract has no right to strike during the life of the contract if the strike is to force a
change in the terms of the contract."); 93 CONG. REC. 5146 (1947) reprintedin LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF 1947 ACT, supra note 30, at 1496 (statement of Sen. Bael) ("[Section 8(d) is]
another provision aimed primarily at protecting the public, as well as the employee, who
have been the victims of 'quickie' strikes").
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DEVELOPING THE THEORY

The Early Cases-UnsuccessfulAttempts to Prohibit Midcontract
Work Relocations

The effect of section 8(d) on employer work relocation during the term
44
of the CBA has been addressed by the NLRB in only a few decisions.
The Board, with limited approval by the reviewing courts of appeals, has
held that relocation of bargaining-unit work during the life of the agreement may constitute an unlawful modification under section 8(d) of the
Act.

45

In University of Chicago,46 the employer operated several medical-academic complexes on its campus. All functions carried on in these complexes were placed under the administrative direction of the University's
Biological Services Division (BSD). 47 The BSD janitorial employees were
represented by two different local unions and were covered by two separate CBAs. 4 ' During the first year of a two-year CBA, BSD advised one
local union 49 that BSD desired to institute a uniform higher standard of
sanitation throughout the hospital complex, and that the only feasible way
to accomplish that goal was to transfer all custodial work to the other local
union.5" BSD transferred the bargaining-unit work despite the union's objections. The union responded to BSD's abrogation of the CBA by filing
unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB.5 The Board held that
BSD's unilateral transfer of custodial work out of the bargaining unit dur52
ing the term of the CBA was a modification of a jurisdictional guarantee
implicitly embodied in the contract's recognition clause in violation of sec44. See supra note 5; see also infra notes 46-106 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 44.
46. 210 N.L.R.B. 190 (1974), enforcement denied, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975).

47. University of Chicago, 210 N.L.R.B. at 191.
48. Id Two hundred of the 219 BSD custodians were represented by the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees' Union (AFSCME), with the remaining 19 being represented by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). Id. at
191, 193.
49. Id at 194. In September 1970, a new two-year CBA was entered into between BSD
and SEIU. In July 1971, SEIU was advised by BSD of the decision to allocate all custodial
work to AFSCME. Id.
50. Id. BSD received numerous complaints from the medical faculty to the effect that

the portion of the medical-academic complexes cleaned by SEIU was being maintained inadequately. Many physicians expressed a desire to raise the overall level of cleanliness to
that maintained by AFSCME members. Id
51. Id at 191.

52. A contract's jurisdictional clause states the union's authority to represent certain
groups of employees in a specific type of work or occupation. See H. ROBERTS, supranote 3,
at 239.
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tion 8(d) of the Act." The Board reasoned that BSD's practice of allocating cleaning areas between the two unions was a part of the bargaining
history leading to the CBA, and thus a jurisdictional guarantee was neces54
sarily embodied in the CBA's recognition clause.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to
enforce the Board's Decision and Order." The court held, on the basis of
existing case precedent, that unless such transfers were specifically prohibited by the CBA, the employer was free to transfer work out of the bargaining unit after bargaining in good faith to impasse.5 6 Having found no
antiunion animus, the court determined that the sole reason for BSD's decision to transfer the work was its desire to institute a uniform higher standard of sanitation in the medical-academic complexes.5 7
Three years later, in Boeing Co.,58 the NLRB employed essentially the
same rationale as it had in University of Chicago in refusing to allow an
employer to relocate bargaining-unit work. The dispute involved union59
ized welders and a manufacturer of military and commercial hydrofoils.
Since 1959, when the union first became certified as the bargaining agent
of the company's employees, all welding had been performed by the bar53. A contract recognition clause identifies the union as the bargaining agent and representative of the employer's employees. See id. at 456.
54. University of Chicago, 210 N.L.R.B. at 190. The Board held that by transferring
work out of SEIU's bargaining unit, the employer had repudiated both the contract recognition clause and the terms and conditions of employment contained in the contract and,
therefore, had violated §§ 8(d) and 8(a)(l), (2), (5) of the Act. 210 N.L.R.B. at 199.
55. University of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975).
56. Id at 949 (citing Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965);
Fibreboard Paper Prod. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964)).
57. Id The Seventh Circuit observed that BSD had a past practice of transferring work
from one bargaining unit to the other and also that there never was a definite line of demarcation concerning the division of cleaning responsibilities. Id at 948. In refusing to enforce
the Board's order the court stated:
We can find no support for this novel theory either in the 'bargaining history' of
this case or in any legal precedents. In our view, the effort of the Board to thus
read a jurisdictional guarantee into a recognition clause seriously impinges upon
the fundamental rights of management and requires reversal.
Id. at 944.
58. 230 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977), enforcement denied, 581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1978). The
Board distinguished the Seventh Circuit's University of Chicago opinion by noting that in
Boeing, the work assigned was not identical to that being performed in each bargaining unit,
there was no history of prior work transfers, and the union had always carefully policed its
unit's jurisdiction. Id at 701. Additionally, unlike the situation presented in University of
Chicago, there were no health and safety considerations alleged in the transfer. Id.
59. Hydrofoils are produced by cutting sheets of aluminum, folding and fitting the
pieces together, and then tack welding them in place, pending the final welding. Id at 697.
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gaining unit employees. 60 However, in the fall of 1975, the employer decided to train nonunion employees to perform the process of tack
welding. 6 Ostensibly, the employer sought to eliminate inefficiency in the
production process. The employer implemented its training program despite the union's objections that such action constituted an unlawful transfer of work out of the bargaining unit.62 The Board, acting on the union's
charge against the employer, held that the employer's action was a modification of the CBA's recognition clause and therefore unlawful under section 8(d) of the Act.63 It reasoned that since all tack welding had been
performed by the bargaining unit employees throughout the history of the
union's bargaining relationship with the employer, tack welding was the
province of those employees whom the union represented under the existing CBA.64
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to
enforce the Board's decision, stating that the Board's interpretation of the
recognition clause as an implied jurisdictional clause was unwarranted and
without a sound basis in law. 65 Relying on the Seventh Circuit's rationale
in University of Chicago, the court concluded that the central issue in Boeing Co. was not whether there had been a midterm modification of the
CBA, but rather whether the recognition clause could support an implied
grant of jurisdiction.6 6 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the employer's
sole motive for transferring the work was a desire to increase the level of
efficiency in production and not a desire to escape the terms of the CBA.6 7
B.

Work Relocation Undertaken to Evade Contractual Labor Costs-A
Legitimate Business Justfication?

The Board adopted the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
in Los Angeles Marine,6 ' and held that the employer violated sections 8(d)
and 8(a)(l), (3) and (5) of the Act by relocating bargaining unit work with60. In February 1975, the employer and the union entered into a new two-year CBA.
Id
61. Id.
62. Id.

63. Id at 704. The Board specifically found that the employer violated §§ 8(a)(1), (5),
and 8(d) of the Act.
64. Id at 698. The Board argued that a jurisdictional guarantee may be "an inextricable, albeit inexplicit" part of a contract's bargaining history and therefore part of the contract itself. Id
65. Boeing Co. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 793, 798 (1978).
66. Id. at 797.
67. Id
68. 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979).
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out the union's consent during the term of the existing CBA.69 The ruling
was upheld despite evidence that the employer had bargained in good
faith concerning the relocation and its effects, the lack of antiunion animus, and the existence of legitimate economic justification.7 °
One of the employer's two divisions, Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co.,
was a party to a CBA covering its recreational sales employees. 7 1 The
employer faced a potential operating loss at the Los Angeles Marine facility in part due to high labor costs. 7 2 During the 1975 negotiations leading
to execution of the CBA, and again in 1976 when the agreement provided
for reopening wage negotiations, the employer unsuccessfully sought to
obtain wage concessions from the union.7 3 Unable to attain the financial
relief it had requested, the employer terminated all of its employees at the
Los Angeles Marine facility and relocated its recreational sales operations." The union filed charges with the NLRB alleging that the employer's actions constituted an unlawful midterm modification of the CBA
75
in violation of sections 8(d), 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act.
The ALJ held that section 8(d) of the Act forbids any party to a CBA
from making a midterm modification of a term contained in the contract
without the other party's consent. 76 He maintained that even if an employer were motivated by valid economic concerns, it could not, absent
union consent, modify wage rates, replace all unit employees, or remove
work from the bargaining unit during the term of the CBA.77 The ALJ
explained that if relocation alone were permitted to vary that result, employers would then be able to accomplish indirectly that which they could
not accomplish directly under section 8(d) of the Act. 78 In addition, the
ALJ found that the employer's discharge of unit employees as part of its
69. Id. at 737-38.

70. Id at 732-33.
71.

Id at 721. The employer's other division, Cal Marine, was an inactive corporate

shell prior to the circumstances giving rise to litigation.
72. Id at 722. In 1975, a survey of the employer's competitors disclosed that its labor
costs were $1.40 per hour higher than those of its highest paying competitor and almost $2
per hour higher than two other competitors. By 1976, the employer was confronted with a
potential $170,000 annual loss and also was experiencing cash flow problems. ld.
73. Id.
74. Id at 724-25. The recreational sales operations were transferred to the inactive corporate shell, Cal Marine. The employer hired new recreational sales employees at wage and
benefits below the level previously required under the existing CBA. Id
75. Id

76. Id. at 735.
77. Id. (citing Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977); Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 207
N.L.R.B. 1063 (1973); AAA Electric, Inc., and Simms Electric Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 247

(1971)).
78. 235 N.L.R.B. at 735.
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plan to escape the economic obligations of the CBA was conduct that was
"inherently destructive" of employee rights, and thus violative of sections
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.79 The Board adopted the ALJ's decision without comment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced the
Board's order, although it observed that the employer was motivated solely
by economic factors and not by unlawful considerations.80 Nevertheless,
the court noted that the employer's actions amounted to a midterm repudiation of the CBA and that such action is not excused by either good faith
or economic necessity. 8 ' Like the ALJ,the court concluded that "[t]o permit such a result would allow an employer to do indirectly what cannot be
done directly under the Act." 2
In Brown Company, the Board reaffirmed the rationale of Los Angeles
Marine.83 The Board majority found that the employer had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discontinuing its cement-hauling operations, laying off employees, and transferring trucks to another division in
order to avoid wage obligations under the CBA. s4 It found the section
8(a)(3) violation on the theory that the employer's actions were "inherently
destructive of employee interests."85 A minority of the Board disagreed
79. Id.at 736 (quoting Rushton & Mercier Woodworking Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 123, 124
(1973), enforced, 86 L.R.R.M. 2151 (1st Cir. 1974)). Generally, a violation of § 8(a)(3) requires a showing that the employer was motivated by a desire to discourage union membership. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965); Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 805 (1945). When an employer's conduct is "inherently destructive" of employee rights, however, a violation of § 8(a)(3) does not require proof of
antiunion motivation. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967) (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965)). The Great Dane Court reasoned that such
conduct "carries with it 'unavoidable consequences which the employer not only foresaw but
which he must have intended' and thus bears 'its own indicia of intent.'" Id at 33 (quoting
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 231 (1963)). For a critical review of the Board's
application of the "inherently destructive" doctrine in work relocation cases, see Irving,
Plant Relocations and Transfers of Work.- The NLRB's "Inherently Destructive"Approach, 34
LAB. L.J. 549-62 (1983).
80. Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1979).
81. Id. at 1307.
82. Id
83. Brown Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 769 (1979). The Board cited Los Angeles Marine and
stated:
[W]e have held that a unilateral removal of bargaining unit work during a contract
term is the type of contract modification proscribed by the Act, regardless of economic justification. Further, under § 8(d) of the Act, a party to the contract cannot
be compelled to bargain about such a modification and, accordingly, any modification can be implemented only with the consent of the other party.
Id at 771 (footnote omitted).
84. Id at 772.
85. Id.at 771 (quoting Rushton & Mercier Woodworking Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 123, 124
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with the majority's findings of fact concerning the employer's conduct. 86
The minority emphasized, however, that it supported the majority's conclusion that a unilateral removal of bargaining-unit work during the term
of the CBA without the union's consent was an unlawful modification of
the CBA.87 The Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's Decision and
Order and remanded the case to the Board for a determination of whether
a work-relocation clause in the contract permitted the employer to transfer
the work.88
Due to the large increase in the number of work relocation cases the
Board sought an opportunity to clarify its rationale and holding in Los
Angeles Marine. It was presented with such an opportunity in Milwaukee
Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring Co.
III.

MILWAUKEE SPRING DIVISION OF ILLINOIS COIL SPRING
COMPANY: STAYING THE COURSE?

The Illinois Coil Spring Company was comprised of three divisionsHolly Spring, McHenry Spring, and Milwaukee Spring.8 9 The employees
at the Milwaukee Spring facility were represented by the International
Union, the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
(1974), enforced, 86 L.R.R.M. 2151 (1st Cir. 1974)). In finding a violation of § 8(a)(3) the
Board majority reasoned that:
It matters not whether Respondent's transfer of its trucks was a result of union
animus, nor that it first bargained with the Union and attempted to get it to sign a
new agreement. It is obvious that Respondent's actions were 'inherently destructive of employee interests' and that the employees lost the jobs to which they were
entitled as a result of Respondent's efforts to escape i.ts economic obligations under
the contract.
Id (footnoted omitted). See supra note 79. The majority found it unnecessary to consider
whether the employer had violated § 8(a)(5).
86. Brown Co., 243 N.L.R.B. at 773-75.
87. 1d at 775. In Tocco Div. of Park-Ohio Indus., 257 N.L.R.B. 413 (1981), enforced,
112 L.R.R.M. 3089 (6th Cir. 1983), the Board held that an employer violated §§ 8(a)(l) and
(5) by refusing to bargain over the decision to relocate bargaining-unit work. In dicta, the
Board cited Brown Co. and stated that a "unilateral removal of bargaining unit work during
a contract term is the type of contract modification proscribed by the Act." 257 N.L.R.B. at
414 n.8. The Sixth Circuit did not comment on the Board's statement concerning unilateral
removal of bargaining-unit work. But see Walter B. Cooke, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 626 (1982)
(employer's removal of bargaining-unit work was not a midterm modification of the contract
violative of § 8(d)).
88. Brown Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 769 (1979), remanded without opinion, 663 F.2d 1078 (9th
Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit's analysis is unofficially reported at 109 L.R.R.M. 2663 (9th
Cir. 1981).
89. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982). The Board determined that each
division was a separate bargaining unit although the company constituted a single employer
within the meaning of the Act. The Holly Spring facility was assimilated into the nonunionized McHenry Spring facility, prior to the events giving rise to litigation. 1d at 206-07.
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Workers of America (UAW), and its Local 524.90 Since 1961, the employer and the union had entered into a series of CBAs, the most recent of
which was effective from April 1980 through March 1983. 9"
In January 1982, during the second year of a three-year CBA, the employer approached the union and proposed that the union forego a scheduled wage increase and grant other contract concessions.92 In March, the
employer announced that its financial situation had worsened, both because of the loss of a substantial customer's business and because of deteriorating economic conditions in general.9 3 During concession bargaining
with the union, the employer proposed relocating its assembly operations
to the nonunionized McHenry Spring facility where labor costs were significantly lower than those at the Milwaukee Spring facility.94 While the
employer expressed a willingness to consider alternatives to the proposed
relocation, it also informed the union that wage and benefit concessions
were necessary to keep Milwaukee Spring's molding operations economically viable. The union presented these concessions to its members, who
voted against acceptance but indicated that they were willing to continue
discussions.9 5 The employer then presented the union with a comprehensive written proposal detailing the terms under which the employer would
retain assembly operations in Milwaukee. In response to the union's inquiry whether this constituted a final offer, the employer stated that although the written proposal approached the minimal concessions the
employer could accept, further bargaining was not foreclosed. 96

The

union membership rejected the employer's specific proposals. as well as any
90. Id.
91. Id at 207.
92. Id
93. Id The employer failed to renegotiate a supplier's contract with Fisher Body, resulting in a $200,000 per month decline in revenue. Id. An employer who asserts that poor
financial performance necessitates wage and benefits concessions may have a duty under
§ 8(a)(5) to supply the necessary information to substantiate its claims. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). The Truitt Court reasoned:
Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer
should be honest claims. This is true about an asserted inability to pay an increase
in wages. If such an argument is important enough to present in the give and take
of bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy.
Id at 152-53.
94. The employer informed the union that its labor costs were $8 per hour in wages and
$2 per hour in fringe benefits at its Milwaukee facility, in contrast to wage and fringe benefit
costs of $4.50 and $1.35 respectively at its McHenry facility. Id at 207.
95. The union membership voted against accepting reductions to the hourly wage and
fringe benefit rates in effect at the McHenry plant. Id
96. The employer explicitly conditioned its relocation decision upon the union's granting of labor cost concessions, and presented the union with a document entitled Terms Upon
Which Milwaukee Spring Assembly Operations will be Retained in Milwaukee. Id
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further consideration of contract modifications. The employer subsequently announced its decision9 7to relocate the Milwaukee assembly operations to the McHenry facility.
The case was submitted to the Board on stipulated facts. 98 The employer stipulated that the relocation of its assembly operations was due
solely to the comparatively higher labor costs under the CBA at the Milwaukee facility.9 9 It further stipulated that the decision to relocate the assembly operations was not prompted by an inability to pay the contractual
labor costs, but rather by a failure to secure an adequate return on investment.1 °o In Milwaukee Spring I, the Board ruled that the employer's decision to transfer its Milwaukee Spring assembly operations to the nonunion
McHenry Spring facility constituted a midterm modification within the
meaning of section 8(d) of the Act.'0 1 It held that the employer was not
privileged to relocate the assembly operations without the consent of the
union or a waiver of the union's statutory right to object to such action."0 2
The employer argued that both the preamble of the CBA and the management rights clause contained therein waived any right the union had to
object to the transfer. 0 3 The Board dismissed both contentions, and found
that the union had not clearly and unequivocally waived its statutory right
to object to the employer's actions. 1°4 It ordered the employer to rescind
its decision to transfer the assembly operations and to reestablish the status
quo ante by restoring to the Milwaukee facility any work that had been
97. Id
98. Id at 206. The parties stipulated to the record and waived any right to a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge. Parties may avoid a formal hearing by stipulating
those facts not in dispute on which they desire a decision. See T. KAMMHOLZ & S. TRAuss,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 77 (1980).
99. Milwaukee Spring ,265 N.L.R.B. at 207.
100. Id.
101. Id.at 210. The Board specifically found that the employer had violated §§ 8(d) and
8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. Id
102. Id Chairman Van de Water based the findings of violations of the Act upon the
parties' stipulation that the employer's transfer of assembly operations was not motivated by
an inability to pay the contractual wage rate. Id at 210 n.7. He indicated that if the employer had faced bankruptcy or if the short-term viability of the corporation had been in
jeopardy, the Board's decision might have been different. Id at 208 n.3. Such a position,
however, is inconsistent with prior Board precedent holding that neither subjective good
faith nor economic exigencies permit an employer to make unilateral midterm modifications
of mandatory terms contained in the CBA. See, e.g., FWD Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1981);
Morelli Constr. Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 1190 (1979); Sun Harbor Manor, 228 N.L.R.B. 945
(1977); Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1973); C & S Indus., 158
N.L.R.B. 454 (1966).
103. Milwaukee Spring ,265 N.L.R.B. at 209-10.
104. Id
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transferred."5 The Board further ordered the employer to reinstate, with
back pay, all employees furloughed as a consequence of the decision to
relocate assembly operations.' °6
On remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, the Board reversed its prior decision and dismissed the complaint
against the employer."' In Milwaukee Spring I1, the Board asserted that
Milwaukee Spring I represented a substantial departure from well-established Board precedent because by its terms the CBA did not restrict the
employer's right to make relocation decisions." 8 The Board held that, in
the absence of a specific work-preservation clause, an employer may transfer work out of the bargaining unit during the term of the CBA if the
employer first satisfies any obligations it may have to bargain about the
relocation decision.109 It reasoned that the employer's actions did not violate section 8(d) because there was no specific provision in the CBA that
restricted work relocation.
In examining the midterm modification issue, the Board noted that in
Milwaukee Spring1, it had never identified the specific contract term modified by the employer's decision to relocate the assembly operations. "o The
Board ruled that identification of the specific term contained in the CBA
that was modified by the employer's decision to relocate was the sine qua
non of a section 8(d) violation."' Rejecting the union's argument that the
employer's relocation decision modified the contract's wage and benefits
provisions, the Board stated that those provisions only represented an
agreement to compensate unit employees at a given rate. It found that the
employer had abandoned all attempts to obtain wage and benefits concessions at Milwaukee Spring prior to making the decision to transfer the
105. Id at 210.
106. Id. at 210-11.
107. Milwaukee Spring 1, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. 1065, 1069 (1984). The
"Motion to Remand to the Board" did not state any reason for the Board's desire to reconsider the Milwaukee Spring I decision. During the interim period between the original decision and the request for remand, however, the composition of the Board changed as a result
of the addition of several Reagan appointees. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
108. Id. at 1067-68. The Board cited Ozark Trailers Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966), for
the proposition that the employer's sole obligation to the union was to bargain in good faith
to impasse prior to implementing any decision to relocate bargaining-unit work. 268
N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1067-68. The Ozark Board required a manufacturer of
refrigerated truck bodies to bargain with the union before deciding to close one of its plants
during the term of the CBA. There had been no allegation of a midterm modification of the
CBA in Ozark. The Board maintained that this was due to its recognition that the employer's sole duty was to bargain about the decision. Id
109. Milwaukee Spring 1, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1066.
110. Id
Ill. Id
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assembly operations." 2 The Board maintained, therefore, that the contractual wage and benefits provisions were not disturbed at the Milwaukee
11 3
facility.
The Board also rejected any contention that the employer's relocation
decision modified the contract's recognition clause." 4 Adopting the reasoning of the reviewing courts of appeals, the Board overruled its prior
holdings in University of Chicago and Boeing.'t 5 In doing so, the Board
asserted that it was not within its province to create an implied work-preservation clause based upon either wage and benefits or recognition provisions. " 6 The Board concluded that the rationale it had applied in
Milwaukee Spring I had the effect of adding terms to the CBA that the
parties had not agreed upon." 7
The Board then examined its holding in Los Angeles Marine that an
employer is not free to transfer work out of the bargaining unit during the
term of the CBA without the union's consent." 18 It noted that the Board's
reliance in Los Angeles Marine on University of Chicago was misplaced.," 9
In the Board's view, University of Chicago did not support Los Angeles
Marine because University of Chicago differentiated between work relocations and work reassignments. The University of Chicago decision had required the union's consent only with regard to work relocation during the
contract's term. The Board found that, even though no logical distinction
could be drawn between work relocation and work reassignment, the
transfer of work of the type at issue in Milwaukee Spring was not proscribed by section 8(d). 2° In adopting the Seventh Circuit's rationale in
University of Chicago, the Board held that for those cases where antiunion
animus cannot be shown and absent a specific contract provision restricting the employer's decisionmaking rights, the full extent of an employer's
112. Id, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1066-67.
113. Id, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1067.
114. Id, see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
115. Id

See Boeing Co. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1978); University of Chicago v.

NLRB, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975); see also supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
116. Milwaukee Spring HI,268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1067. The Board
stated: "[n]o doubt parties could draft such a clause; indeed, work-preservation clauses are
commonplace. It is not for the Board, however, to create an implied work-preservation
clause in every American labor agreement based on wage and benefits or recognition provisions, and we expressly decline to do so." Id (footnote omitted). See supra note 32.
117. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1068.
118. Id See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
119. Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1068.
120. Id
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obligation to the union was to bargain in good faith to impasse.' 2 1
The Board then addressed its finding in Milwaukee Spring I that the
employer violated section 8(a)(3) when it laid off unit employees as a consequence of its decision to transfer work. 122 It reasoned that the section
8(a)(3) violation had been contingent upon the finding of a section 8(a)(5)
violation. 123 Because it found that the employer's decision to transfer
work was not a violation of section 8(a)(5), the Board concluded that there
was no basis for finding a violation of section 8(a)(3).' 2 4
Finally, the Board stated that both Los Angeles Marine and Milwaukee
Spring I discouraged meaningful midterm bargaining over decisions to
relocate bargaining unit work.125 It asserted that an employer contemplating a relocation would have an incentive to deny that its decision to relocate work was based upon labor costs. Such a denial would avoid granting
to the union the right to veto the relocation decision. 126 The Board maintained that its holding in Milwaukee Spring II, on the other hand, would
encourage meaningful and realistic exchanges between the parties on the
subject of work relocation and thus foster the process of collective
27

bargaining. 1

In dissent, Member Zimmerman asserted that absent the union's consent, section 8(d) of the Act prohibited the employer from transferring
work out of the bargaining unit in order to obtain relief from the labor
costs under the CBA.'2 8 He argued that there are two key issues that must
be addressed in every work relocation case. The first issue is whether the
employer's decision to relocate bargaining-unit work is a mandatory subject of bargaining. 2 9 Zimmerman maintained that because the employer's
121.

Id.(citing Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); Fibreboard

Paper Prod. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964)).
122. Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1069. See supra note
79.
123. Milwaukee Spring I, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at
124. Id
125. Id
126. Id The Board maintained that unless the union is denied
relocation decision, the employer would be hesitant to discuss wage
union out of fear that these discussions "would be used as evidence
motivated the relocation decision." Id

1069.

the right to veto the
concessions with the
that labor costs had

127. Id.
128. Id (Zimmerman, dissenting). See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
129. Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1069. Member Zimmerman stated that the "threshold issue" of whether the employer's decision to relocate
bargaining-unit work was a mandatory subject of bargaining was governed by the Supreme
Court's decision in First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). Milwaukee Spring 11,268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1070-71. In FirstNat'l Maintenance,
the Court held that management decisions were mandatory subjects of bargaining only if
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decision to relocate work was "amenable to resolution through [collective]
bargaining," it constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining. 3 ° The second key issue is whether section 8(d) prohibits an employer from relocating work out of the bargaining unit after bargaining to impasse during the
term of the CBA.' 3 ' Zimmerman emphasized that he would find an employer's decision to relocate work violative of section 8(d) only when the
employer's sole or predominant motivation was to evade the terms of the
CBA.' 3 2 He asserted that the employer's decision to transfer work from
Milwaukee Spring to McHenry Spring was motivated solely by its desire to
avoid the contractual wage rates. 133
Member Zimmerman then suggested that the critical inquiry in ascertaining whether the relocation of bargaining-unit work is violative of section 8(d) must focus on the employer's motive to relocate. 34 He
maintained that if an employer's decision was motivated by a desire to
they were "amenable to resolution through the bargaining process" and "the benefit for
labor-management relations ... outweigh[ed] the burden placed on the conduct of the business." First Nat'l Maintenance,452 U.S. at 678-79. Zimmerman criticized the majority for
treating the employer's decision as a mandatory subject of bargaining based on the parties'
stipulation that the employer had satisfied its bargaining obligations. Milwaukee Spring If,
268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1070 n.2.
130. Milwaukee Spring I, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1069. In Otis Elevator
Co., 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Otis Elevator ], the Board found that the
employer's decision to transfer bargaining-unit work was a mandatory subject of bargaining,
and held that the employer's refusal to bargain with the union over that decision violated
§§ 8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act. Id at 235-36. In Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. No. 162, slip.
op. (April 26, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Otis Elevator 1A], the Board reconsidered its finding
in Otis Elevator I in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in First Nat'l Maintenance v.

NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). See supra note 129. The Board, in Otis Elevator II, held that
because the employer's decision to relocate bargaining-unit work turned "upon a change in
the nature or direction of the business," it was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. 269
N.L.R.B. No. 162, slip. op. at 5-6. The Board found that the employer had not based its
decision upon labor costs, but rather upon its determination that its facilities were outdated,
its product was not competitive, its research and development operation duplicated other
operations, and a newer and larger research and development center was available. Id., slip
op. at 5. Member Zimmerman agreed with the majority that the employer's decision was
not a mandatory subject of bargaining because the concerns underlying the employer's decision were not amenable to resolution through collective bargaining. 1d, slip op. at 14-15
(Zimmerman, concurring in part and dissenting in part). Where, however, "union concessions may substantially mitigate the concerns underlying the employer's decision . . . [and]
absent any showing of the employer's urgent need for the kind of speed, flexibility, or secrecy as referred to by the Court in First NationalMaintenance," Zimmerman would require
the employer to bargain over the decision to transfer bargaining-unit work. Id at 15.
131. Id See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
132. Milwaukee Spring 1, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1069.
133. Id. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
134. Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1069. See Bosanac,
Concession Bargaining, Work Transfers, and Midcontract Modification." Los Angeles Marine
Hardware Company, 1983 LAB. L.J. 72, 78; O'Keefe & Tuohey, Economically Motivated
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avoid the terms of the CBA, then the decision would violate sections 8(d)
and 8(a)(5), and thus the employer could not lawfully transfer work during
the term of the CBA without the union's consent. 13 He asserted that the
obligation of an employer was to bargain with the union in good faith to
136
impasse prior to implementing any decision to relocate.
The minority criticized the majority's assertion that the contractual wage
and benefits provisions at the Milwaukee Spring facility were not disturbed by the employer's decision to relocate the bargaining-unit work.' 3 7
It stated that it was "disingenuous" to suggest that the provisions were
unimpaired when there would be no employees
left at the Milwaukee
1 38
Spring facility to receive the wages and benefits.
The dissent also criticized the majority's claim that the rationale of Los
Angeles Marine and Milwaukee Spring Icreated an implied work-preservation clause in virtually every CBA. 139 It asserted that the rationale of these
two decisions does not depend on the existence of a work preservation
clause, but rather on the employer's desire to modify the contractual wage
rate, a result proscribed by section 8(d).' 4 ° The dissent also disagreed with
the Board's contention that the rationale of Los Angeles Marine and Milwaukee Spring I encouraged employers to deny that the relocation decision
is motivated by labor costs. It suggested that avoidance of the disruption
in production is a substantial incentive for an employer to engage in concession bargaining with the union.' 4 ' Finally, the dissent noted that Milwaukee Spring IIwas inconsistent with the express declaration of Congress
that there no longer be a system of continuous bargaining.' 4 2
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILWAUKEE SPRING DECISION

Section 8(d) of the Act proclaims that neither party to a CBA is required
to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms contained in the agreement.' 4 3 Through section 8(d), Congress sought, interalia,to promote the
Relocations of Work and an Employer's Duties under Section 8(d) of the National Labor RelationsAct: A Three Step Analysis, I I FORDHAM URB. L.J. 795, 842-43 (1983).
135. Milwaukee Spring If, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1074. With regard to

the Board's reliance on Ozark, Zimmerman noted that Ozark was not analyzed under a
§ 8(d) theory, and thus was inapposite to a discussion of the applicability of § 8(d) of the Act
to the facts of Milwaukee Spring. Id at 1075 n.19.
136. Id at 1074.
137. Id
138. Id
139. Id
140. Id.
141. Id at 1075.
142. Id

143. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982); supra note 36.
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industrial peace that results from CBAs of fixed duration.'44 To effectuate
the congressional goal of labor stability, section 8(d) imposes two separate
duties on the parties to an extant CBA. First, the parties are prohibited
from using economic pressure tactics for the purpose of either securing a
reopening of the agreement or retaliating against the other party for refusing to reopen the agreement. 45 Second, the parties may not unilaterally
46
modify the terms and conditions of the agreement.
The Board's decision in Milwaukee Spring H can be most strongly criticized for focusing solely on the issue of whether the employer unilaterally
modified a specific term of the agreement by relocating bargaining-unit
work in violation of section 8(d)(4). The Board rejected the argument that
the CBA's wage and benefits provisions were modified indirectly by the
transfer of bargaining-unit work. 47 Unable to find an express provision in
the CBA prohibiting relocation of bargaining-unit work, the Board refused
to hold that the employer's actions violated section 8(d). As the dissent
aptly noted, however, because there would be no employees at the Milwaukee Spring facility to receive the wages and benefits, the Board's contention that these provisions were not modified arguably is without logic
and exalts form over substance.
Even assuming arguendo, that the Board correctly found that there was
no section 8(d)(4) unilateral modification, it still failed to evaluate the employer's actions with respect to the section 8(d) proclamation that neither
party can be forced to discuss or agree to a modification of a term contained in the extant agreement. 148 In so doing, the majority disregarded
the stipulation that the employer's relocation decision was motivated solely
by the employer's desire to avoid the contractual wage rates. The Board
decisions in Los Angeles Marine,Brown Co., and Milwaukee Spring I were
premised on the Board finding that the employer's decision to relocate was
144. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 35-36.
146. Id See also supra notes 40-41.
147. Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1066-67. This position
is inconsistent with prior Board precedent. See C & S Indus., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966). In
C & S Indus., the Board stated:
[W]here an employer unilaterally effects a change which has a continuing impact
on a basic term or condition of employment, wagesfor example, more is involved
than just a simple default in a contractual obligation. Such a change manifestly
constitutes a "modification" within the meaning of Section 8(d). And if not made
in compliance with the requirements of that section, it violates a statutory duty the
redress of which becomes a matter of concern to the Board.
Id at 458 (emphasis added).
148. See supra note 35.
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motivated by a desire to escape the terms of the CBA. 149 The majority's
reasoning in Milwaukee Spring H, however, is notable for having taken
what Los Angeles Marineand its progeny had established as a factual issue
and resolving it as a matter of law without regard to the facts of the case.
Moreover, in light of the employer's admitted motivation in Milwaukee
Spring, it was unnecessary for the Board to consider the more conceptionally difficult section 8(d)(4) unilateral modification issue.
The operational effect of Milwaukee Spring1H is to cast an aura of legitimacy upon an employer's use of work relocation as an economic weapon
to obtain midterm contract concessions from a union. This effect must be
contrasted with the unquestioned prohibition against union use of economic weapons aimed at obtaining modifications of the extant agreement.150 As a practical matter, absent a specific work-preservation clause
in the contract, a union now has no choice but to bargain about midterm
changes at the request of the employer or risk losing bargaining-unit
work. " ' This use of work relocation or any other economic weapon for
the purpose of forcing a reopening of the agreement is clearly inimical to
the congressional objective of labor stability. It is hardly conducive to industrial peace to allow an employer to eviscerate the CBA of the employer's freely assumed obligations by the simple expedient of threatening
to transfer work out of the bargaining unit. Such a result is clearly inconsistent with the "contained in" langauge of section 8(d).' 5 2 Indeed, Congress rejected exactly this type of continuous bargaining system in enacting
this statutory provision.' 53 Thus, an employer's relocation of bargainingunit work motivated by a desire to force the reopening of the CBA is contrary to the express intent of Congress and hence, violative of sections 8(d)
and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.
149. In Los Angeles Marine, the employer's admitted motivation for relocating the bargaining-unit work was its desire to evade the labor costs of the CBA. 235 N.L.R.B. at 735.
In Brown Co., the Board found that the employer relocated work "for the sole purpose of
escaping from its wage obligations under the existing collective-bargaining contract." 243
N.L.R.B. at 77 1. Finally, in Milwaukee Spring I, the employer stipulated that the sole reason
for its decision to relocate work was its desire to escape the labor costs of the CBA. 265
N.L.R.B. No.28, IlI L.R.R.M. at 1486.
150. See, e.g., Brewery Delivery Employees Local Union 46, 236 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1173-74
(1978); Chauffeurs, Salesmen and Helpers Local 572, 223 N.L.R.B. 1003, 1008 (1976); Communications Workers of Am., 204 N.L.R.B. 782, 784-85 (1973); Telephone Workers Union
of N.J., Local 827, 189 N.L.R.B. 726, 734 (1971).
151. An employer's use of work relocation as an economic weapon to obtain a midterm
bargaining demand is the functional equivalent of an offensive lockout. See American Ship
Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (initiating offensive lockout).
152. See supra note 36.
153. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, the Board's reasoning that Los Angeles Marine created an implied work-preservation clause in virtually every CBA appears flawed.
Los Angeles Marine does not infer a work guarantee from the wage provision of the CBA. Relocation of bargaining-unit work during the life of the
CBA is not per se unlawful. As the dissent in Milwaukee Spring II observed, the employer's motivation is the determinative factor in ascertaining whether the relocation of bargaining-unit work is lawful. 154 Under
this theory, an employer motivated by legitimate business reasons is not
prohibited from transferring work out of the bargaining unit.155 The purposeful evasion of express contract provisions accomplished through the
vehicle of work relocation, however, would constitute an unlawful
154. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1075. The principle that the parties to a

contract are under a good faith commitment not to take actions designed to evade their
freely assumed obligations is well-established in contract law. See Cox, The LegalNature of
Collective BargainingAgreement, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1, 31 (1958) ("[O]ne might fairly conclude in the absence of other evidence that the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement establishing wages and labor standards imply an obligation not to seek a substitute

labor supply at lower wages or inferior standards.");

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-

§ 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement."). The duty of good faith requires that each
party refrain from conduct that would prevent or hinder the performance of its own duty, or
of the performance of the other party's obligation, and to take affirmative action to cause the
occurrence of the condition. See also J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, A REVISION OF
GRISMORE ON CONTRACTS § 187 (2d ed. 1974); E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17 (1982).
The party's duty to exercise good faith when that party has discretionary control over a
provision of a contract is exemplified in output and requirements contracts. In contracts of
these types, the parties are allowed to manage their businesses in accordance with their best
business judgment regardless of the effect on output or requirements. The good faith requirement, however, prohibits business modification when the motivation for that modification is to undermine, circumvent, or avoid the terms of the contract itself. See, e.g., Lambert
Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1978); Weaver & Assoc. v. Asphalt Constr., 587 F.2d
1315 (D.C. Cir. 1978); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1966);
Western Oil & Fuel Co. v. Kemp, 245 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1957).
155. See, e.g., Boeing Co., 581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1978) (no violation of § 8(d) found
when the sole motivation for the decision to transfer work was the desire to increase the level
of efficiency in production); University of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975) (no
violation of § 8(d) found when the sole motivation for the decision to transfer work was the
desire to raise the level of sanitation); see supra notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
The Board's Division of Advice will recommend that a complaint be dismissed when the
employer's decision to relocate work is not motivated by a desire to evade the terms of the
CBA. See, e.g., Chino Mines Co., 112 L.R.R.M. 1419 (1983) (complaint disrhissed because
the employer's actions were motivated solely by economic considerations unrelated to the
labor costs of the CBA); Greyhound Lines, Inc., 112 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1983) (complaint dismissed because the employer's actions were motivated by efficiency reasons and not by a
desire to escape the terms of the CBA); Stewart Sandwiches, Inc., 112 L.R.R.M. 1422 (1982)
(complaint dismissed because the employer's actions were not motivated by a desire to
evade the terms of the CBA).
TRACTS
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midterm modification of the contract. 15 6 Therefore, Los Angeles Marine
only prohibits employer use of work relocation as an economic weapon to
obtain midterm contract concessions from the union.
Finally, this rationale, in accord with Los Angeles Marine,does not foreclose meaningful midterm bargaining between the parties. The desire to
avoid disruptions in production is a strong motive for an employer to engage in open and frank negotiations with a union. Likewise, the desire to
protect union jobs as well as the union's awareness that the economic
problems will have to be addressed at the contract's expiration, provides
an incentive for unions to be amenable to compromise. Where employers
have legitimately demonstrated their financial difficulties, many unions
have responded, and will continue to respond, to an opportunity to save
their jobs." 7
V.

CONCLUSION

In Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring Co., the National
Labor Relations Board ruled that absent a specific work-preservation
clause, an employer is free to transfer work out of the bargaining unit during the term of the CBA if the employer first satisfies any obligation he
may have to the union to bargain about the relocation decision. The immediate effect of Milwaukee Spring II is to allow an employer to use the
threat of work removal to force union concessions during the term of the
agreement. This result is clearly inconsistent with the explicit intent of
Congress, embodied in section 8(d), to promote the labor stability that results from CBAs of fixed duration. Moreover, Milwaukee Spring I
removes the assurance that a CBA, once executed, will firmly establish the
terms and conditions of employment, and thus the Board's decision undermines the process of collective bargaining as a means to settle industrial
labor disputes.
Kevin RichardHayes

156. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 208-09; Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. at 700-04;
Los Angeles Marine, 602 F.2d at 1306-07.
157. See supra note 4.

